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Abstract
People make decisions every day that have significant impact on others. The
current experiment investigates the learning and decision-making processes involved
when small groups confront a complex social dilemma under different learning
conditions designed to imitate common educational interventions used in classrooms and
non-laboratory settings. Participants (N=96) were randomly assigned to one of three
conditions. In the Explore-First condition (n=32), participants played one round of a
simulated social dilemma board game before receiving a lesson on social dilemmas, then
played a second round. In the Lesson-First condition (n=32), participants received the
lesson before playing the game. In the Contrast condition (n=32), participants received
the lesson without playing the board game. Participants in the Explore-First condition
performed significantly better on a quiz assessing their conceptual understanding of
social dilemmas and transfer to new dilemmas. Individuals in the Explore-First condition
also found the lesson more interesting, and generally showed greater acceptance of public
policies intended to improve ecological sustainability. Educational interventions to
improve cooperation in social dilemmas may benefit from an initial exploratory phase,
where individuals experience critical features of the problem before being taught about
them.
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Playing Games to Improve Conceptual Understanding and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas
People’s decisions impact others, often without their awareness, and can create
rivalry that harms society and the natural world. For example, the Ogallala aquifer in the
Midwest U.S. provides about 30% of all water used in U.S. agriculture, but this resource
is being used faster than it can be replenished. Many individual farmers are not fully
aware of the collective impact that they are having on each other, or this limited, shared
resource. Those farmers who are aware often compete over water for personal survival
and economic viability, increasing rivalry (Royte, 2016). This kind of situation, where
individuals are tempted and compelled by self-interest to destroy shared resources they
rely on, is a social dilemma (Hardin, 1968).
Resource based social dilemmas (resource dilemmas) such as the Ogallala aquifer
are pervasive in society (Ostrom, 1998), and are a key factor in war, political and social
unrest, and ecological collapse (e.g., Kelly et al., 2015). It is for this reason that scientific
explanations for decision making are vitally important (Ostrom, 1998). One such
explanation, classical rational choice theory (Hardin, 1968; Hobbes, T. 1651-1909),
predicts that people are trapped in social dilemmas and will inevitably destroy the
resource and themselves because they are too selfish to work together towards mutual
benefit.
However, research consistently shows that stakeholders in a social dilemma can,
in fact, learn from experience to cooperatively solve these problems (Ostrom, 1998).
Research also demonstrates that playing games that simulate the real-world dilemma one
is in, as an experience-based teaching tool, can sometimes improve learning and facilitate
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cooperation in the actual dilemma (e.g., García-Barrios et al., 2011; Meinzen-Dick et al.,
2018). However, the underlying social and cognitive mechanisms that promote successful
learning and cooperation are poorly understood (Ostrom, 1998; Yu et al., 2016), making
it difficult to design effective educational interventions.
The current study uses experimental methods to investigate the decision making
and learning processes involved when individuals confront a social dilemma situation.
Our research project advances behavioral theory by using simulated social dilemma
games to explore how people make complex decisions. By using a board game to let
participants experience a social dilemma where their decisions will impact one another,
this project will also identify new ways of educating the public on how to recognize the
deeper underlying structure of social dilemmas. We will use exploratory and discoverybased learning literature in education psychology to examine the role of exploratory
learning in helping participants better learn the deep structure of social dilemmas.
Decision Making in Social Dilemmas
Traditional Rational Choice Theory
Rational Choice Theory was born from the philosophical tradition of
utilitarianism, which defines the best action as the one that provides the most utility. It
assumes that actors are narrowly self-interested, and that they make their decisions
rationally from a position of knowledge. The primary problem with this theory is that
traditional RCT focuses nearly exclusively on financial and strategic elements of choice.
RCT fails to convincingly account for widespread deviations from narrow self-interest,
such as self-governance, where individuals band together while making agreements and
devising their own effective solutions to social dilemmas (Ostrom, 2010). In addition, it
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does not anticipate that individuals can learn from prior experience to positively, and
holistically, constrain their individual self-interest for mutual benefit to a group and to the
environment itself. If placed in a social dilemma, individuals are therefore expected to
behave selfishly, destroying the shared resource and free riding on other people’s
contributions to the group welfare (Hardin, 1968; Hobbes, T. 1651/1909).
Bounded Rationality
Bounded Rational Choice Theory (BRCT) emerged to account for the more
nuanced nature of people’s values and cooperative decisions (Simon, 1972). BRCT
acknowledges that self-interested individuals can learn with experience. BRCT also
acknowledges that reality is subjective and socially constructed, and that differences in
the way people perceive and understand their decisions influences their cooperative
behavior in social dilemmas. Ostrom (1998) in particular argued that people can learn to
trust one another and create social and rule-governed systems that facilitate long-term
cooperation, despite their inherent self-interest and flawed cognitive faculties.
The issue with BRCT is that it fails to examine fully the factors that contribute to
a person’s value system and underlying motivations (e.g., fundamental socialpsychological needs; DeCaro, 2018). In addition, Ostrom’s (1998, 2005) BRCT was
underdeveloped in terms of accounting for the hypothesized learning processes that
decision makers engage in when learning how to solve complex social-ecological
dilemmas. One such process is Bayesian Reasoning, wherein a person forms an initial
mental representation of the situation (mental model; Jones et al., 2011) then revises their
mental model based on experience, as more information about the situation and
consequences of one’s actions become available (Berkson, 1930). Thus, people learn, but
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it is not clear how they learn or what conditions facilitate such learning (Meinzen-Dick et
al., 2018; Yu et al., 2016). More research needs to be conducted to clarify these
motivational and learning processes.
Humanistic Rational Choice
Humanistic Rational Choice Theory (HRCT; DeCaro, 2018) extends Ostrom’s
(1998, 2010) BRCT by explicitly incorporating broader value systems, perception
systems, and learning processes from cognitive and social psychology and shown here in
Figure 1.

Figure 1. Motivational Framework for Humanistic Rational Choice Theory. Reprinted from DeCaro, D. (2018).
Humanistic rational choice and compliance motivation in complex societal dilemmas. (pp. 126-147). In S. Espinosa, S.
Siddiki, & T. Heikkila (Eds.), Contextualizing Compliance in the Public Sector: Individual Motivations, Social
Processes, & Institutional Design. Routledge.

According to HRCT (see Motivational Subsystem, Figure 1; DeCaro, 2018),
people look to government systems and each other to satisfy fundamental needs and
manage social dilemmas well (e.g., Frey et al., 2004; Tyler, 2006). Mismanagement of
social dilemmas and poor governance decrease perceptions of legitimacy and jeopardize
these needs and well-being, motivating individuals to learn and try to solve the dilemma
(DeCaro, 2019). people are inherently motivated to understand the world and solve
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difficult problems that affect their core goals, fundamental needs, and well-being (e.g.,
Bandura, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2017). When people learn and solve problems as a group it
helps them internalize their motivations, which increases trust and cooperation.
For example, consider the classic resource dilemma (Hardin, 1968), where
farmers need to share a limited pasture for grazing their cattle. Each farmer seeks to make
a profit, grazing as many cattle as they can. Hence, if any farmer feels that the rules or
regulations that are used to restrict their individual grazing disadvantage them personally
or fail to ensure that others comply with the rules, then their financial (economic) and
security needs may be poorly satisfied, reducing cooperation. Moreover, if the farmers’
efforts to address their concerns through communication are perceived as unfair, then this
can lead to a perception that the decision-making process is illegitimate, undermining
their need for procedural justice (fair decision-making procedures) and selfdetermination. Deficits to these fundamental needs, and recognition that the dilemma is
not being managed well, should motivate individuals to try to correct the problem.
Communication is a key element in correcting deficits in fundamental needs, as farmers
reach out to their neighbors and political representatives to discuss solutions Such group
cognition triggering the Bayesian (iterated) learning process identified by Ostrom (2005).
Through this process, strictly competitive players may eventually learn mutually
beneficial solutions to the dilemma. During this process, they should develop a better
understanding of the critical social and ecological features of the problem.
HRCT (DeCaro, 2018, 2019) also states that each person’s mental model, or
conceptual representation of the decision situation and environment, affects their
willingness to cooperate, specifically by altering perceptions of the situation and key

PLAYING GAMES TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING

8

elements within it, as we see in the Mental Model Subsystem from Figure 1. An accurate,
and shared, mental model of the situation is essential to successfully solving a social
dilemma (Ostrom, 1998, 2005) and, ultimately, satisfying one’s fundamental needs (e.g.,
DeCaro et al., 2017). In the previous example, if farmers successfully update their mental
model by learning important dynamics of the ecological problem, and better understand
the social factors and dimensions of the dilemma that drive their behavior, then they may
be able to cooperate better, improve their economic security and welfare, and sustain
their resource. However, HRCT has not yet clarified the cognitive mechanisms involved
in such learning, or the educational conditions that facilitate optimal learning.
Learning Processes
Social Learning
Behaviorists have long studied the link between the decisions a person makes and
their history of learning (i.e., reinforcement and punishment; e.g., Hume, 1738; Skinner,
1969). This link between learning and decision making is expressed as reciprocal
determinism, wherein a person’s thoughts and feelings (i.e., cognates) both influence and
are influenced by their own actions, as well as the actions of others in their environment
(Bandura, 1978). Boyd and Richerson (2009) argue that cultural adaptation, the ability to
learn from each other, developed over time and lead to natural selection within groups
that increasingly favored pro-social behaviors. These cooperative social environments
were shaped by social systems of rewards and punishments bound up in moral traditions
and gave rise to complex internalized moderators like shame and empathy. This
evolutionary model shows how behavioral mechanics and the development of social
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norms serve to moderate competition and allow people to learn from their mistakes and
each other in a social environment (Boyd, 2009).
The relationship between behavior and social norms leads us to mental models,
which are learned through interaction with others and refined via rewards and
punishments (Bandura, 1978; Skinner, 1969). Mental models are shaped by social
learning and can occur via communication, or through direct observation of other’s
actions and the resulting consequences. Once mental models are well established, a
person can become highly intractable in their views of the world and trapped in
behavioral sequences that prevent them from being able to solve problems by employing
new perspectives and methods (Nickerson, 1998). They may even fail to recognize the
social nature of their problem, preventing them from taking the actions that would result
in favorable outcomes for both themselves and others (Abrams et al., 1990). When a
person’s social environment leads to such an uncooperative mental model this can lead to
social-ecological dilemmas.
People in a social-ecological dilemma make decisions and learn from one another
and the environment, through ongoing interactions. These interactions are not always
obvious to those involved and can lead to harmful outcomes. However, the dynamics that
lead to more effective cooperation and compliance are not well understood. More
research is needed to observe how individuals interact in a typical social-ecological
dilemma, in order to identify potentially important cognitive and social learning
processes (Anderies et al., 2011; Frey & Goldstone, 2018). Recent advancements in
cognition and education, and exploratory learning, could provide additional insight into
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the fundamental learning processes involved in mental model updating, and learning of
important concepts in complex systems, like a social- ecological dilemma.
Exploratory Learning
Traditional instructional in education relies on providing explicit instruction to the
learner before having them solve a problem (e.g., providing a lecture on math before
asking a student to solve an equation). However, learning from lecture is typically more
superficial, and students often forget what they learn shortly thereafter (Dunlosky &
Rawson, 2012). In order to promote deeper understanding, instructors are increasingly
adopting active, or more discovery-based learning approaches. One such method,
exploratory learning, changes the lesson order so that an initial problem-solving phase is
followed by an instruction phase (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). Exploratory learning is
thought to promote an increased awareness of the deep structure inherent to the problem,
as well as improvements in the learner’s ability to transfer what they have learned to
other scenarios (Schwartz & Bransford, 1998). By letting the learner experience the
problem space prior to receiving instruction, and by allowing the learner’s experience
with the problem to inform future instruction, exploratory learning facilitates prior
knowledge activation, awareness of gaps or errors in one’s knowledge and understanding,
and recognition of deep problem features that are crucial to the solution (Loibl, Roll, &
Rummel, 2017; DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson, 2012).
For example, DeCaro and Rittle-Johnson (2012) tested the impact of exploratory
learning with respect to children’s ability to solve unfamiliar math problems. They
showed that exploration led children to have a greater understanding of their own ability,
be more willing to try new strategies (DeCaro, DeCaro, & Rittle-Johnson, 2012), all of
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which made them better prepared for future instruction. DeCaro and colleagues have
replicated and extended these findings in undergraduate physics courses (Weaver,
Chastain, DeCaro, & DeCaro, 2018). Though these previous studies examined conceptual
knowledge development in math and science courses, we anticipate that similar learning
mechanisms are involved in social dilemmas.
Bayesian Reasoning
Ostrom’s (2005) initial theory of Bayesian reasoning provides a framework which
combines the cultural evolution and exploratory learning perspectives discussed earlier in
a way that helps explain the learning process involved in a social dilemma. Cultural
pressures serve to shape a person’s mental model, and by extension their perceptions of a
given situation, but people do possess the ability to learn from their experiences and
revise such models in a process known as Bayesian Reasoning.

Figure 2. The relationship between information, action-outcome linkages, and
internal mental models. Reprinted from Ostrom, E. (2005). Animating Institutional Analysis. In Understanding
Institutional Diversity (pp. 99-134). PRINCETON; OXFORD: Princeton University Press.

Ostrom’s model, pictured in Figure 2, outlines the processes that influence a
person’s decisions (Ostrom, 2005). Here, we focus on how an individual processes

PLAYING GAMES TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING

12

information about the social-ecological dilemma situation, in light of previous
expectations (e.g., mental models), and learns from prior experience. It is assumed that
learning in a social-ecological dilemma is an iterated, reciprical process among the
person, their environment (social and ecological), and the outcome of their prior actions
over many trials (Bandura, 1978). Depending on the circumstances, experience may lead
a person to revise their mental model in ways that improve their individual and collective
success (e.g., individual earnings and cooperative outcomes), or increasingly hinder those
efforts (i.e., people can learn from their mistakes but only if they see them as mistakes.
This simple process of learning from trial-and-error experience, to update prior
expectations, describes the basic concept of Bayesian Reasoning. Ostrom (2005)
illustrates the Bayesian Reasoning process as a series of learning paths. According to
Ostrom (1998), communication can help actors pool their information and gather more
accurate understanding about the ecological dynamics of a social-ecological dilemma,
updating the mental model and potentially leading to more effective resource
management. In addition, actors may learn about others’ motivations and intentions, and
be able to come to agreements that further clarify and constrain people’s behaviors,
making the social and ecological situation more predictable and secure. If these actors are
further able to communicate and govern in ways that satisfy needs for procedural
fairness, belonging, and competence, then HRCT predicts cooperation will be
internalized, developing robust cooperation (DeCaro, 2018).
However, in order for positive learning outcomes to be achieved, it is imperitive
that individuals accurately perceive and understand their own knowledge gaps and the
deep structure of the social and decision-making environment when revising their model
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of the situation (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017). This may be one way in which
communication, as well as the method of educational instruction and learning, become
crucial. Specifically, one of the goals of exploratory learning is to aid individuals in the
process of understanding deep structures of complex problems by allowing a person to
explore the problem space, learning from trial-and-error, as they attempt various solutions
within their current conceptualization of the problem space (DeCaro & Rittle-Johnson,
2012). Thus, exploratory learning may be particularly useful to individuals in a social
dilemma situation, helping them to better learn from experience and understand
underlying crucial features of the problem.
Social dilemmas involving resource management are among the most complex,
requiring a deep understanding from stakeholders (i.e., those who depend on the
resource) of the interrelationship between the resource being managed and those who
seek to utilize it (DeCaro et al., 2017; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2018). Failure to develop a
sufficiently accurate mental model of such interrelationships can significantly undermine
the stakeholder’s ability to contribute in a positive way towards managing the resource
and may even lead to over use or depletion. Such a mental model deficit may also make it
difficult or impossible for the stakeholder to address their fundamental needs within the
collective action space, further eroding their ability to make meaningful contributions
(DeCaro, 2018). For example, participants in our social dilemma simulation game who
do not have an adequate understanding of the strains they collectively apply to the game’s
forest resources, or their combined contribution to the siltation levels of the water
resources, may not fully understand the need to reduce or restrict access when these
resources are in danger of collapse. This misconception can lead to distrust between
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players, undermining critical conservation efforts. On the other hand, with sufficient
education and communication opportunities made available, the players involved may see
potential collective action solutions that would otherwise be missed. The current project
will investigate these processes, using a simulated social dilemma game.
Using Simulated Social Dilemma Games to Encourage Learning
A simulated social dilemma game emulates the core social and environmental
elements of resource conflict (i.e., resource dilemma), or public service or good provision
(i.e., public good dilemma), placing individuals in situations where they must interact
with one another in competition, or cooperation. Because it is a game, groups can
experience the social and environmental outcomes of their behavior, allowing them to
learn from their actions, free from real world consequences.
By giving individuals the opportunity to experience and explore a social dilemma
in a relatively simple but relevant environment, simulation games could potentially
bridge the gap in their mental models, allowing stakeholders to better understand the
essential dynamics of a social-ecological dilemma and improving cooperative outcomes.
Studies have used simulation games to increase core understanding and real-world
efficacy with regard to resource dilemmas such as coffee farming (García-Barrios, CruzMorales, Vandermeer, & Perfecto, 2017), ground water management (Meinzen-Dick, et
al., 2018), and land usage (García-Barrios, García-Barrios, Waterman., & Cruz-Morales,
2011).
Luis García-Barrios developed a resource dilemma simulation game (Sierra
Springs) using game theory principles. Sierra Springs is a simple way for stakeholders
(i.e., people personally invested in the issue) to explore the interconnected social aspects
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of resource usage and conceptualize expert instruction on solution sets to problems they
may face regardless of their education levels (García-Barrios L., García-Barrios,
Waterman, & Cruz-Morales, 2011). Garcia-Barrios et al. (2011) demonstrated that Sierra
Springs can help improve communication between researchers and farmers towards
coordinating strategies in response to land management dilemmas, while also allowing
them to explore the social nature of such dilemmas and the impact that can have on
solution set equitability. Garcia-Barrios et al. (2017) also examines how simulation style
board games together with graphical and narrative based presentations can allow coffee
farmers with little formal education to engage with scientists in gaining a deeper
understanding of the complex social and ecological factors involved with their land and
crops (García-Barrios, Cruz-Morales, Vandermeer, & Perfecto, 2017). Both studies show
qualitative and quantitative benefits of adapting instruction methods to better reflect the
learner’s life experience.
These studies continue to be expanded into other resource dilemma scenarios such
as groundwater management. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2018) explored how collective action
games can increase cooperation between stakeholders, expand their understanding of the
complex and interconnected factors involved in groundwater management, and improve
sustainability over time. Their research, conducted in Andhra Pradesh, India, shows how
communication within a simulation game can increase the likelihood of stakeholders
achieving sustainable outcomes for ground water use. It is important to note that this
increased cooperation did not become significant until the second year, and outweighed
other behavioral factors such as trust levels, education levels, and gender. The study
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found that use of simulation games can significantly increase the proportion of
communities that adopt water registers and rules to govern groundwater use.

Figure 3. A conceptual diagram of how feedback-driven learning occurs in SESs. The inner-loop (or single-loop)
learning entails fine-tuning of specific strategies or actions to better meet existing goals or assumptions. The outer-loop
(or double-loop) learning involves updating of goals or assumptions that underlie specific strategies. The circle with
letter R represents the process of monitoring of and reflection on past outcomes. The arrow denoted by di represents
internal issues (e.g., collective action problems). Environmental variability is represented by the arrows denoted by do
(e.g., natural disasters). Several conditions, e.g., user participation in decision-making, knowledge sharing, etc., can
influence the loop learning processes. Reprinted from David, J. Y., Shin, H. C., Pérez, I., Anderies, J. M., & Janssen,
M. A. (2016). Learning for resilience-based management: Generating hypotheses from a behavioral study. Global
Environmental Change, 37, 69-78.

Yu et al. (2016) utilized a simulated resource dilemma task to investigate the
relationship between collective action, learning strategies, and success under
environmental variability. According to the model employed in the Yu et al. (2016) study
we can see the relationship between the goals each member of a group sets, their strategy
for achieving such goals, how those strategies interact with the social-ecological system
itself, and how the outcomes they achieve are analyzed to improve future decision
making. Important contributors to this process are the assumptions a person makes, their
reflections on the situation they are in, and most importantly loop learning.
Loop learning, as seen in Figure 3, refers to Bayesian feedback loops such as the
reciprocal social learning outlined by Bandura (1978). The model employed by Yu et al.
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(2016) is similar to Ostrom’s (2005) approach: it outlines two types of loop learning,
inner-loop learning (entails fine-tuning of specific strategies or actions to better meet
existing goals or assumptions), and outer-loop learning (involves updating of goals or
assumptions that underlie specific strategies). Their research reveals that coordinated
collective action and inner-loop learning elements, such as revised and shared strategies
along with active monitoring of the social-ecological systems (SESs) involved, are
enough for social-ecological success under stable conditions. Outer-loop learning is
critical to social-ecological resilience in circumstances involving variability. In other
words, the study employed a simulated social dilemma game to demonstrate that groups
who are able to better revise their strategies in response to changing goals and
assumptions are more successful than others when dealing with unpredictable
circumstances (Yu, Shin, Pérez, Anderies, & Janssen, 2016).
Our experiment looks at the impact of using a social dilemma simulation game to
address flawed mental models that interfere with a person’s ability to solve problems by
employing new perspectives and methods (Nickerson, 1998) or to recognize the social
nature of their problem. This process relies on setting the person in a seemingly unrelated
task, such as a game, and allowing them to exhaust their fixed methods trying to win at
the game. They are given only minimal instruction in the beginning in order to allow
them their own perspective of the action space, and only after they have reached an
impasse are they guided towards new approaches. The most important aspect of this
method involves a gradual association on the part of the person between the game they
are participating in, and the larger social dilemma that it represents. The intent of this
method is to bypass their previously held biases on a social dilemma, allowing them to
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gain new outlooks and tools that will enable them to recognize a social dilemma more
easily when they are in one. According theoretical developments in educational
psychology, such exploratory learning may allow for deeper understanding of underlying
concepts when compared to the more traditional explicit instruction (i.e., lecture then
task) method of teaching (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017).
Current Study
The current study examined the role of exploratory learning, motivation, and
social learning and perception in the development of conceptual knowledge, and
promotion of cooperation, in a simulated resource dilemma. Participants learned about a
real-world resource dilemma in the context of a board game and three different learning
conditions: a Contrast condition, in which participants heard a lecture on the topic and
board game, then read a detailed article about the real-world dilemma; a Lesson-First
condition, in which participants were taught key concepts before playing the game; and
an Explore-First condition, in which participants played the game before receiving the
lesson.
According to exploratory learning research, letting the learner experience the
problem space prior to receiving instruction facilitates prior knowledge activation,
awareness of gaps or errors in one’s knowledge and understanding, and recognition of
deep problem features that are crucial to the solution (Loibl, Roll, & Rummel, 2017).
Therefore, we anticipate that individuals will learn core concepts better when they have
the opportunity to experience those concepts themselves. If better understanding of a
social dilemma facilitates a perception of responsibility and efficacy to take action, then
these participants may also show an increased willingness to support costly public
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policies designed to ameliorate the social dilemma, and donate money to a relevant
charity, if given the opportunity to do so. However, many other factors contribute to
policy choice and action, so increased knowledge may not be sufficient (Cornforth, 2009;
McKenzie-Mohr, 2000).
According to HRCT, communication may not only improve understanding, but
also facilitate cooperation, if used to devise fair and effective strategies and agreements
for managing the limited resources in the dilemma (DeCaro, 2018, 2019). However, the
current thesis project will focus on the learning processing and outcomes. Socialpsychological processes of cooperation will be addressed in later reports.
We employed a Contrast condition in this study. The purpose of the contrast
condition was to determine if the board game itself had an impact on any of the observed
outcomes, beyond a more traditional lecture and read instructional format. We anticipate
that the board game will increase participants core understanding of the social (i.e., selfinterest and interdependency) and ecological (i.e., limited resources and tragedy)
dynamics involved in a social dilemma, resulting in higher performance from those who
play the board game compared to those in the Contrast condition (García-Barrios L.,
García-Barrios, Waterman, & Cruz-Morales, 2011).
A survey measuring motivations and perceptions (e.g., trust) was given to the
Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions at the end of the experiment in order to assess
change in fundamental social cognitions proposed by HRCT, as well as a quiz assessing
their understanding of social dilemmas and ability to recognize other kinds of dilemmas.
The Contrast condition also received a modified version of the survey without measures
of perception, as well as the same quiz given to the other two conditions. The survey also
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asked participants to indicate their willingness to support social and economic policies,
such as restrictions on cattle grazing, economic fines for non-cooperation, and increased
water conservation. Finally, as a potential measure of real-world cooperation, participants
were given the opportunity to donate some of their earnings from the game to a relevant
charity.
Methods
Participants and Design
Data for this project was collected Fall 2018 (and is ongoing). Undergraduate
students (N = 96, Age M = 19.06, 40.8% female) were recruited from the University of
Louisville psychology subject pool. Due to recruitment constraints, we report the partial
data for the experiment. Data collection will be completed later this semester (projected
recruitment is 180 participants). Participants (N = 96) were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions; Explore-First (n = 32), Lesson-First (n = 32), or a Contrast condition (n
= 32). Each session of the Lesson-First and Explore-First condition included four to eight
participants, and random assignment was used to create one or two groups of four players
each (N = 16 groups). Participants volunteered for 120 minutes and received research
credit, in partial fulfillment of course requirements. In addition, participants were paid
based on an in-game economy, to create a compelling economic resource dilemma that
allows for competition and rivalry (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Participants could earn
up to $16.75 based on their decisions in the game ($13) and learning quiz performance
($3.75). This study was approved by the university IRB.
Procedure
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Figure 4. Illustration of conditions and order of events.

Participants were randomly assigned to condition. After completing informed
consent in a waiting room where they were instructed not to speak with other
participants, they were taken to a classroom with two tables and a viewing screen. In the
Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions, tables were furnished with one copy each of
the Sierra Springs board game. One score card for each player was provided. A laptop
computer with an internal camera was set up and angled towards the gameplay board for
recording each players actions and communication while retaining anonymity. A backup
audio recorder was also utilized. Participants in all conditions received basic gameplay
instructions, as well as a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas. These instructions
were prerecorded for consistency, and approximately 18 minutes long.
Individuals randomly assigned to the Explore-First condition played one 20minute session of the board game Sierra Springs (García-Barrios L. R., García-Barrios,
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Cruz-Morales, & Smith, 2015), without the ability to communicate with other players,
giving them the opportunity to experience the social dilemma first-hand. Afterward, they
received a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas, intended to improve conceptual
understanding of the social and ecological situation, and cooperation. They then played
another 20-minute session of the game. During Game 2 they were able to communicate
with each other. Levels of conflict and in-game cooperation were recorded, comparing
Game 1 and Game 2. After playing both rounds of the game they were asked to complete
a learning quiz and survey which were administered on a private computer station and
given a donation opportunity.
Individuals in the Lesson-First condition instead received the lesson before
Game 1, so that they played the game as practice, or demonstration, of principles learned
from the lesson. All other aspects of the two conditions were identical, so that exploration
(order of lesson) was the only difference between conditions. After playing both rounds
of the game they were asked to complete a learning quiz and survey which were
administered on a private computer station and given a donation opportunity.
Participants in the Contrast condition were given the same lesson on the nature
of social dilemmas as the other two conditions, and then asked to read the National
Geographic magazine article To The Last Drop (Royte, 2016). The article described an
example of a cattle farming dilemma in the Ogallala Aquifer in the U.S. Midwest.
Participants in the contrast condition did not play the board game. After completing the
article, they were asked to complete a learning quiz and survey which were administered
on a private computer station and given a donation opportunity.
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Participants were given their payment for quiz and board game earnings in the
form of a Visa pre-paid card before being completing the donation activity. Finally, all
participants were provided with debriefing material, thanked for their help, and given the
opportunity to ask questions about the study.
Materials
Lesson. Participants in all conditions received basic gameplay instructions, as
well as a brief lesson on the nature of social dilemmas based on the National Geographic
magazine article To The Last Drop (Royte, 2016). The lesson was designed to teach key
social aspects of a social dilemma such as self-interest and interdependence, as well as
ecological aspects like resource scarcity and destructive consumption. These instructions
were prerecorded for consistency, and approximately 18 minutes long.
Resource Dilemma Game. To simulate a cattle grazing social dilemma,
participants in the Explore-First and Lesson-First conditions played Sierra Springs
(García-Barrios L. R., García-Barrios, Cruz-Morales, & Smith, 2015). We modified the
game for the present study. In particular, we began each player with a number of cattle
and timber tokens already on the board, and eliminated a mechanic involving the spring
which feeds the creeks and provides drinking water for the farmers as we shown in
Figure 5. These modifications were made to simplify and speed up game play in order to
fit the constraints of our experiment.
Four players take the role of cattle farmers, competing over land and water for
economic gain. Each player has a designated plot as illustrated in Figure 5. In the
beginning, the playing field is covered in forest tokens and some cattle. Players received
$0.25 for each point earned. Each forest token is worth 1 point ($0.25); low cattle tokens
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are worth 2 points ($0.50) and high cattle tokens are worth 3 points ($0.75). The players
take turns deciding whether or not to place tokens, and where. Players generally graze as
many cattle as they can to earn more points.
It is possible for all players to earn 26 points ($6.50 per game), ensuring a stable
and equitable use of the limited grazing fields. However, the actions each person takes to
score points also come with economic and environmental costs. Each cattle placed on the
board requires the removal of one forest token (i.e., deforestation). In addition, each
player’s plot abuts two other players’ plots, with a shared stream supplying water to the
cattle, as seen in Figure 5. Those spaces are allocated to players on a first-come-firstserve basis, creating competition. Finally, deforestation and having too many cattle near
water sources threatens players’ survival. If 68% (33) of the forest tokens are removed,
then a catastrophic event is triggered: top soil becomes compacted and susceptible to
mudslides that silt up waterways and make the area uninhabitable. All players lose (and
their earnings are lost) if someone fails to correct the problem by removing one of their
cattle tokens and replacing it with a forest token. In addition, if two adjacent players (e.g.,
Player 1 and Player 2) place a total of 3 cattle tokens on their shared creek, then the creek
is threatened and all cattle on the creek will die (losing those points) unless one of those
players immediately corrects the problem by removing a cattle token. These elements
introduce four fundamental problem features characteristic of many social dilemmas:
self-interest and competition, collective interdependency, scarcity, and ecological
collapse (tragedy).
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Figure 5. Initial board layout in our modified setup of The Sierra Springs game board.

Communication. Communication is a powerful tool to help stakeholders in a
social dilemma learn from experience and potentially devise cooperative solutions
(Balliet, 2010). During Game 1 players in the Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions
were not allowed to communicate. During Game 2 all players were able to talk directly to
one another as they played. With permission of the participants, these conversations were
audio recorded. In addition, we video recorded the board itself, to have a record of each
player’s decisions (plays in the game). These data will be analyzed as part of another
project, to identify potential agreements, exchange of information and social learning,
and social interactions that influence fundamental motivations and behavior.
Outcome Measures
Quiz. Participants completed a quiz to assess conceptual understanding of the
defining social and ecological features of a resource dilemma and ability to apply
(transfer) what they have learned to real-world social dilemmas (see Appendix A). The
quiz consisted of fifteen multiple choice and three short essay questions. Participants
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were paid for correct answers on the quiz to reward learning and ensure that participants
tried their best (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Participants were informed of this payment
during the informed consent process, during gameplay instruction, and again prior to
finalizing the payment sheet for processing. Participants received $0.50 for each essay
question they attempted, and $0.15 for each correct multiple-choice item, for a maximum
of $3.75. The computer automatically scored the multiple-choice items and presented the
score to the participant and experimenter at the end. Items were separated by social and
ecological dimensions to emphasize potential differences in learning these dynamics.
The Quiz questions are listed in Appendix A.
Essay. Essay Questions 1 and 2 both assessed the key social and ecological
dimensions of the dilemma. Question 1 asked participants to identify and explain the key
features of a social dilemma. Question 2 asked participants to do the same specifically for
the cattle farming board game. Essay Question 3 asked participants to explain how the
cattle farming game represents a complex environmental situation, assessing their deeper
knowledge of the ecological dynamics inherent to the dilemma. Items were separated by
social and ecological dimensions to emphasize potential differences in learning these
dynamics. The results for essay question three were not reported in this paper due to the
need for further analysis.
Multiple Choice. Fifteen multiple choice items assessed participants’
understanding of the core social concepts and dimensions of the social dilemma, as well
as their ability to identify their presence and implications in the cattle farming board
game. These concepts included how their own decisions affect others (social
interdependency) and self-interest (e.g., competition for shared land, lack of concern for
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others’ welfare). One item (Question 4) was removed from the analyses, because in
hindsight there was no single correct answer. Three additional items assessed participants
understanding of the ecological dynamics involved in resource dilemmas and the cattle
farming game in particular, including regional deforestation, localized creek collapse, and
impacts of intensive cattle farming.
Transfer. Transfer items measured the ability of participants to transfer their
understanding of the core features of social dilemmas to other kinds of social dilemmas.
This step was important to assess the extent to which playing a simulated social dilemma
helps to educate people about real-world dilemmas, as well as improve real cooperation.
We used two items for assessing identification of resource dilemmas, three items for
assessing identification of public good dilemmas, and one (foil) item for assessing
discrimination between social dilemmas and other types of dilemmas.
In particular, the transfer questions assess: (a) participants ability to recognize
similar types of resource dilemmas in the real-world, such as the real-world Ogallala
Aquifer cattle dilemma; (b) resource dilemmas in different sectors, for example,
competition over fisheries, oil, or timber; (c) different kinds of social dilemmas, in
particular, a public good dilemma, where individuals need to contribute time or personal
resources (e.g., money) to produce something beneficial for everyone (e.g., blood
donation, paying taxes); and (d) the ability of participants to distinguish social dilemmas
from other kinds of societal problems and games that lack social interdependency (e.g.,
the game of solitaire, natural disaster).
Interest, Enjoyment, and Engagement. Four survey items (α = .93) assessed
participants’ level of interest, enjoyment, and engagement with the experiment, as a way
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to determine how interesting and engaging participants found the three different learning
conditions. These items were selected from a larger pool of items assessing motivation
and perceptions that will be included in later projects.
Policy Preferences. Six survey items assessed participants’ support of costly
economic and conservation policies related to the cattle farming social dilemma. Item 1
assessed willingness to support policies that reduce the number of cattle raised in the
Ogallala Aquifer region of the United States. Item 2 assessed policies that monitor water
use and require water conservation. Item 3 assessed willingness to pay higher prices to
improve farmers’ livelihoods and environmental conservation, whereas Item 4 assessed
willingness to pay higher prices to reduce the number of forests cut down to make room
for farms. Item 5 assessed belief that cattle farming in the United States should continue
operating like it currently is, and Item 6 assessed belief that cattle farming in the United
States should be increased, with more cattle and more large-scale farms.
Donation Activity. We identified charitable causes and organizations (See
Appendix B) related to the focal social dilemma (cattle ranching, water scarcity), and
other dilemmas. We carefully selected two charities that were directly related to
economic, social, and economic sustainability of U.S. farming (Farm Aid, Cornucopia
Institute); one charity that is related to environmental conservation in general (The
Conservation Fund); and one charity related to social welfare (The Rotary Foundation).
In addition, these charities accepted small online donations (necessary for the
experiment), were highly regarded by third party charity report organizations (e.g.,
Charity Navigator), and did not explicitly take a particular political stance (e.g.,
conservative, liberal).
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Participants were given the opportunity (choice) to donate some of their earnings
to the charity, as a tangible indicator of cooperation. Donations were handled privately
via computer, and blinded from the experimenter, so that individuals could make a
voluntary decision free from social pressure (See Appendix B for procedures). The
amount of money donated anonymously to charities at the end of the experiment was
used to assess differences in participants’ understanding of deep mechanics within social
dilemmas, as well as their ability to transfer what they have learned to real world
dilemmas.
Cooperation and Conflict. Communication will be analyzed at a later date, along
with game play choices concerning threat events (such as deforestation and creek
collapse), in order to explore overall cooperation levels between condition.
Results
Analyses
These analyses are based on partial data and should therefore be considered
preliminary results, or trends that will be finalized when data collection is complete. It is
our judgment that there is sufficient data to do such preliminary analyses, and we will
point out any analyses for which there is insufficient data to make observations on. In
keeping with standard practice in education research and social dilemma research we
report the overall significant tests for condition comparisons in this paper, but proceed to
use planned comparisons of specific conditions, regardless of overall significance
because we made a-priori predictions about the relationships between the conditions
(Howell, 2011).
Learning Quiz
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In this section, we report the findings for participants’ conceptual understanding
as measured by multiple choice and essay quiz responses.
Multiple Choice. Overall, there was a non-significant difference among
conditions for multiple choice performance of social concepts, F(2,90) = 2.54, p = .085,
2 = 0.05. there was also a non-significant difference among conditions for multiple
choice performance of ecological concepts, F(2,90) = 3.30, p = .720, 2 = 0.01. However,
because we made a-priori predictions about specific relationships among groups, we
conducted planned comparisons to examine this potential trend further.
Social Concepts. As illustrated in Figure 6, participants in the Explore-First
condition (M = 83.07% correct, SE =1.61) performed significantly better than those in the
Contrast condition (M = 77.01%, SE = 2.70), t(90) = 2.09, p = .039, 𝑑̂ = 0.53, and
marginally better than those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 78.13%, SE = 1.75), t(90)
= -1.75, p = .083, 𝑑̂ = 0.44. Scores of participants in the Contrast and Lesson-First
conditions were not significantly different, t(90) = 0.38, p = .702, 𝑑̂ = 0.10.
Mean Percent Correct: Social Concepts (Multiple Choice)
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40

Lesson First

30
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0
Figure 6. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Ecological Concepts. When looking at the items that assess participants’
understanding of the ecological dynamics of social dilemmas, we found no significant
difference in participant’s performance, F < 1, 2 = 0.01. As shown in Figure 7,
participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 61.46% correct, SE = 2.64) did not
significantly differ from those in the Contrast condition (M = 58.62%, SE = 2.70), t(90)
= .709, p = .480, 𝑑̂ = 0.19. The same was found when comparing participants in the
Contrast and Lesson-First conditions (M = 61.46%, SE = 3.03), t(90) = .709, p = .480, 𝑑̂
= 0.19. When comparing participants in the contrast condition to those in the ExploreFirst condition we see no statistical difference between the two conditions t(90) = .000, p
= 1.00, 𝑑̂ = 0.
Mean Percent Correct: Ecological Dynamics (Multiple Choice)
100
90
80
70
60

Contrast

50

Explore First

40

Lesson First

30
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0
Figure 7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Essay. I report the results of each essay question separately to illustrate
participants’ general (Essay 1), and specific (Essay 2) conceptual understanding. The
social and ecological dimensions of Essays 1 and 2 are emphasized to highlight the
differential learning of these concepts.
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Essay 1. Essay 1 assessed participants’ ability to identify four critical features of
resource social dilemmas in general. We found a significant difference among conditions,
F(2,90) = 6.50, p = .002, 2 = 0.13. As seen in Figure 8, participants in the Explore-First
condition (M = 83.59%, SE = 4.71) displayed a significantly higher level of
understanding than participants in the Contrast condition (M = 52.59%, SE = 7.27), t(90)
= 3.60, p = .001, 𝑑̂ = 0.92, and those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 67.19%, SE =
6.09), t(90) = 1.95, p = .05, 𝑑̂ = 0.40. The difference between participant performance in
the Lesson-First and Contrast conditions was not significant: t(90) = 1.69, p = .09, 𝑑̂ =
0.36. Given the moderately strong effect size, we believe this lack of significance is due
to small sample size.
Participants in all three conditions performed similarly in terms of their ability to
identify key ecological features of a resource social dilemma, F < 1, 2 = 0.009. As seen
in Figure 8, participants in the Contrast condition (M = 37.07%, SE = 7.30) did not show
a significant difference from those in the Explore-First condition (M = 29.69%, SE =
6.39), t(90) = -.767, p = .445, 𝑑̂ = 0.25, or the Lesson-First condition (M = 29.69%, SE =
6.59), t(90) = -.767, p = .445, 𝑑̂ = 0.24. This lack of significance may be due to small
sample size. Participants in the Explore-First condition showed no significant difference
from those in the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = .000, p = 1.000, 𝑑̂ = 0.01.
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Mean Score: Social and Ecological Dimensions (Essay 1)
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Figure 8. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Essay 2. Essay 2 assessed participants’ ability to identify four critical features of
resource social dilemmas that were particular to the simulated social dilemma board
game. When we looked at the elements measuring understanding of social dimensions,
we found a significant effect among conditions, F(2,90) = 5.77, p = .004, 2 = 0.11. As
seen in Figure 9, participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 90.63%, SE = 3.51)
displayed a significantly higher level of understanding than those in the Contrast
condition (M = 63.79%, SE = 6.97), t(90) = 3.29, p = .001, 𝑑̂ = 0.84, as well as those in
the Lesson-First condition (M = 71.88%, SE = 6.33), t(90) = 2.35, p = .021, 𝑑̂ = 0.59.
Participants in the Lesson-First condition showed no significant difference from those in
the Contrast condition, t(90) = .989, p = .325, 𝑑̂ = 0.25.
When we looked at the elements measuring understanding of ecological
dimensions, we found no significant difference among conditions, F < 1, 2 = 0.00. As
seen in Figure 9, participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 71.09%, SE = 5.63)
displayed no significant difference from those in the Lesson-First condition (M =
68.75%, SE = 6.64), t(90) = .264, p = .792, 𝑑̂ = 0.07, or those in the Contrast condition
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(M = 68.97%, SE = 6.87), t(90) = 2.34, p = .816, 𝑑̂ = 0.06. Participants in the LessonFirst condition did not significantly differ from those in the Contrast condition, t(90) =
-.024, p = .981, 𝑑̂ = 0.01.
Mean Score: Social and Ecological Dimensions (Essay 2)
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Figure 9. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Transfer
Resource Dilemmas. No significant difference among conditions was found when
analyzing participants’ ability to identify resource dilemmas, F < 1, 2 = 0.01. A small
but non-significant effect was found between participants in the Contrast condition (M =
72.41% correct, SE = 5.31) and those in the Explore-First condition (M = 64.06%, SE =
5.60), t(90) = -1.047, p = .298, 𝑑̂ = 0.27. This is seen in Figure 10. Participants in the
Contrast condition showed no significant difference from those in the Lesson-First
condition (M = 67.19%, SE = 5.77), t(90) = -.655, p = .514, 𝑑̂ = 0.17. There was no
significant difference between participants in the Lesson-First condition and those in the
Explore-First condition either, t(90) = .402, p = .689, 𝑑̂ = 0.10.
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Mean Score Correct: Resource Dilemma Concepts (Multiple Choice)
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Figure 10. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Public Good Dilemmas. Overall, there was no significant difference among
conditions, in terms of ability to transfer their knowledge of resource social dilemmas to
identify public good dilemmas, F(2,90) = 2.16, p = .121, 2 = 0.05. However, as
illustrated in Figure 11, for novel public good dilemmas participants in the Explore-First
condition (M = 71.88% correct, SE = 4.99) performed significantly better than those in
the Lesson-First condition (M = 57.29%, SE = 5.45), t(90) = -2.018, p = .047, 𝑑̂ = 0.50.
Participants in the Explore-First condition did not score significantly higher than those in
the Contrast condition (M = 67.82%, SE = 5.09), t(90) = 0.55, p = .585, 𝑑̂ = 0.14. The
difference between participants in the Lesson-First and those in the Contrast conditions
was not significant, t(90) = -1.420, p = .159, 𝑑̂ = 0.36.
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Mean Score Correct: Public Good Dilemma Concepts (Multiple Choice)
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Figure 11. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Foil. As we see in Figure 12, there were no significant difference between
conditions on the foil item, F(2,90) = .12, p = .899, 2 = 0.002. Though not significant,
participants in the Contrast condition had the highest percentage correct (M = 82.76%, SE
= 7.14) compared to those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 81.25%, SE = 7.01), t(90) =
-.147, p = .884, 𝑑̂ = 0.04, and those in the Explore-First condition (M = 78.13%, SE =
7.43), t(90) = -.451, p = .653, 𝑑̂ = 0.12. There was no significant difference between
participants in the Lesson-First condition and those in the Explore-First condition, t(90) =
.312, p = .756, 𝑑̂ = 0.08.
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Mean Score Correct: Social Dilemma Discrimination (Multiple Choice)
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Figure 12. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Interest, Enjoyment, and Engagement
We found a significant effect when we looked at overall level of interest by
condition, F(2,92) = 14.55, p < .001, 2 = .24. Participants in the Lesson-First condition
(M = 5.98% correct, SE = .20) reported finding the experiment significantly more
interesting than those in the Contrast condition (M = 4.48%, SE = .21), as did participants
in the Explore-First condition (M = 5.70%, SE = .20). Participants in the Explore-First
condition and those in the Lesson-First condition showed no significant difference, as
seen in Figure 13.
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Mean Score: Overall Level of Interest (Survey)
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Figure 13. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Policy Preferences
Question 1. This question looked at preference to support policies that reduce the
number of cattle raised in the Ogallala Aquifer region of the United States. As we see in
Figure 14, we found no significant difference by condition, F(2,90) = 1.56, p = .216, 2 =
.03. Those in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.72%, SE = .15) were not significantly
different than those in the Lesson-First condition (M = 2.38%, SE = .18), t(90) = 1.550, p
= .125, 𝑑̂ = 0.38, or those in the Contrast conditions (M = 2.38%, SE = .14), t(90) =
1.493, p = .139, 𝑑̂ = 0.38. There was no significant difference between participants in the
Lesson-First and Contrast conditions, t(90) = -.019, p = .985, 𝑑̂ = 0.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 1 (Survey)
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Figure 14. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Question 2. This question looked at willingness to support policies that monitor
water use and require water conservation. As illustrated in Figure 15, there was a
significant difference between conditions F(2,90) = 3.12, p = .049, 2 = .06. Participants
in the Explore-First condition (M = 3.13%, SE = .14) showed a moderate and significant
effect in willingness to support such policies when compared to those in the Contrast
condition (M = 2.62%, SE = .182), t(90) = 2.246, p = .027, 𝑑̂ = 0.58, as did participants
in the Lesson-First condition (M = 3.09%, SE = .15), t(90) = 2.107, p = .038, 𝑑̂ = .53.
Participants in the Explore-First condition showed no significant difference from those in
the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = .143, p = .887, 𝑑̂ = 0.05.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 2 (Survey)
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Figure 15. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Question 3. This question examined participants’ willingness to pay higher prices
in order to improve farmers’ livelihoods and environmental conservation. As seen in
Figure 16, there was no significant difference between conditions F(2,90) = .085, p =
0.919, 2 = .002. Participants in the Lesson-First condition (M = 3.00%, SE = .19)
showed no significant difference in willingness to support such policies when compared
to the those in the Contrast condition (M = 2.90%, SE = .17), t(90) = .407, p = .685, 𝑑̂ =
0.10, nor did those in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.94%, SE = .18), t(90) = .161, p =
.872, 𝑑̂ = 0.04. Participants in the Lesson-First and Explore-First conditions showed no
significant difference, t(90) = -.252, p = .802, 𝑑̂ = 0.06.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 3 (Survey)
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Figure 16. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Question 4. This question measured willingness to pay higher prices in order to
reduce the number of forests cut down to make room for farms. As seen in Figure 17, we
found no significant difference by condition F(2,90) = 1.65, p = 0.198, 2 = .04.
Participants in the Explore-First condition (M = 2.81%, SE = .16) showed a small but
non-significant effect in willingness to support such policies when compared to those in
the Contrast condition (M = 2.38%, SE = .18), t(90) = 1.69, p = .094, 𝑑̂ = 0.43, and no
significant difference from participants in the Lesson-First condition (M = 2.75%, SE =
.20), t(90) = .250, p = .803, 𝑑̂ = 0.06. Participants in the Lesson-First condition also
showed a small but non-significant effect when compared to those in the Contrast
condition, t(90) = 1.448, p = .151, 𝑑̂ = 0.37.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 4 (Survey)
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Figure 17. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Question 5. This question asked about belief that cattle farming in the United
States should continue operating like it currently is. Overall, we found no significant
difference based on condition F(2,90) = .78, p = 0.460, 2 = .02. This is illustrated in
Figure 18. Those in the Explore-First condition (M = 1.41%, SE = .10) showed a small
but non-significant effect in their lower support for such a policy when compared to those
in the Lesson-First condition (M = 1.59%, SE = .10), t(90) = -1.24, p = .216, 𝑑̂ = 0.30,
and no significant effect compared to those in the Contrast condition (M = 1.52%, SE =
.13), t(90) = -.718, p = .474, 𝑑̂ = 0.18. Participants in the Lesson-First condition showed
no significant difference from those in the Contrast condition, t(90) = .495, p = .622, 𝑑̂ =
0.12.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 5 (Survey)
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Figure 18. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Question 6. This question looked at belief that cattle farming in the United States
should be increased, with more cattle and more large-scale farms. As shown in Figure 19,
we found no significant difference based on condition F(2,90) = 1.55, p = 0.219, 2 = .03.
Participants in the Contrast condition (M = 1.28%, SE = .14) showed a small but nonsignificant difference in their lower support for such policies when compare to those in
the Lesson-First condition (M = 1.59%, SE = .14), t(90) = 1.65, p = .102, 𝑑̂ = 0.41, and
no significant difference from those in the Explore-First condition (M = 1.34%, SE =
.12), t(90) = .35, p = .725, 𝑑̂ = 0.08. Participants in the Explore-First condition showed a
small but non-significant effect in their lower support for such a policy when compared to
those in the Lesson-First condition, t(90) = -1.33, p = .186, 𝑑̂ = 0.33.
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Mean Score: Policy Preference 6 (Survey)
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Figure 19. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Donation Amount. When looking at charitable donations, the Median donation
amount was $0 in all conditions. In the Contrast Condition, 31% of participants (n = 10)
donated, 25% of the participants in the Explore-First condition (n = 8) donated, and 40%
of the participants in the Lesson-First condition (n = 13) donated. Given the very low rate
of donation in each condition, there was not enough data to make any meaningful
comparisons.
Cooperation and Conflict. Communication and game play choices concerning
threat events (such as deforestation and creek collapse) will be analyzed at a later date.
Game Earnings. When looking at overall earnings between conditions F(1,62) =
.101, p = .751, 2 = .002, the Median was $11.13.
Discussion
In this study we used multiple-choice and short answer essay questions, together
with earnings and decisions from a simulated social dilemma board game to assess the
impact of lesson order on participants’ ability to cooperate, learn core social dilemma
concepts, and transfer what they have learned to other types of dilemmas. We examined
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these measures across three different conditions: Lesson-First, which played two 20minute rounds of the board game after receiving a lesson on social dilemmas, ExploreFirst, which played one 20-minute round of the board game before and after receiving the
lesson, and a Contrast condition that received the lesson and read the article it was based
on but did not play the board game at all.
Some potential benefits of this research include informing our understanding of
the relationship between exploratory learning and conceptual understanding in a problem
space, thus shedding light on the dynamics that lead to more effective cooperation and
compliance in social dilemmas. This preliminary report will be followed by additional
data collection and analysis, with the belief that our current findings justify further study.
Although many factors have yet to be analyzed do to time and complexity, and some
failed to provide useful insight due to small sample size, we have, nevertheless, made
several noteworthy observations.
One encouraging finding of this study relates to participant’s significant ability to
identify novel public good dilemmas in the Explore-First condition when compared to the
Lesson-First condition. This suggests that the ability to explore the problem space before
receiving the lesson increased conceptual understanding of how dilemmas occur beyond
just the social dilemma that participants learned about. Participant’s motivation in
learning tasks also showed a significant increase when using the simulated social
dilemma board game. People assigned to the conditions that engaged with the board
game reported higher levels of interest and enjoyment than those in the contrast group,
which did not play the board game. This has important implications for teaching methods
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that involve active learning tasks, suggesting that the board game increases engagement
in learning about social dilemmas.
When we looked at the essay question assessing understanding of social
dimensions and ecological dimensions within a social dilemma, we found no significant
difference between condition and ecological dimension understanding, but we did see a
significant difference in understanding of social dimensions. Participants in both ExploreFirst and Lesson-First conditions showed a greater understanding of social dimensions
within a social dilemma than in the Contrast condition, with the Explore-First condition
showing a significant advantage. This outcome was repeated in the essay question
assessing understanding of social dimensions and ecological dimensions within the social
dilemma simulation game, with no significant difference in ecological understanding but
a significant advantage in social dimension understanding shown by participants in the
Explore-First condition. This finding may be due to the way in which participants
encounter the social dilemma in practice, and as a group in both Explore-First and
Lesson-First conditions. They must navigate such social dimensions in order to play the
game, whereas ecological dimensions must be triggered in order to learn from them. If
groups did not trigger the ecological dimensions, such as creek collapse or deforestation,
they would not learn from them.
This benefit of exploration was also found on survey items related to policy
preferences. We found a pattern whereby participants in both Explore-First and LessonFirst conditions showed a greater willingness to support conservation-based policies than
the Contrast condition. Those in the Explore-First condition tended to show more support
for conservation-based policies, and less willingness to support non-conservation-based
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policies than the Lesson-First condition. This finding continues to suggest that engaging
with a simulation game has a positive impact on learning outcomes, and that exploration
followed by instruction outperforms traditional lecture and task approaches for at least
some learning outcomes. We believe that quiz scores may correlate with policy
preferences such that those conditions that engaged with the game in general, and
Explore-First in particular, gained a greater understanding of core social dilemma
concepts which lead to greater preferences for policy solutions. This connection should
be explored further as the research progresses.
The multiple-choice findings are somewhat consistent with the essay findings.
Some findings of interest from the multiple-choice items include a significantly higher
ability for the Explore-First condition to recognize the core features of public good
dilemmas. While not statistically significant, several other multiple-choice items trended
towards the Explore-First condition, suggesting that further study could support an
advantage in exploring first with regards to recognizing core problem features and
transferring knowledge. The Contrast condition tended to perform worse than both
Lesson-First and Explore-First, suggesting the use of a social dilemma simulation game
has a positive impact on learning. When we looked at multiple choice items designed to
assess learning by condition, we found many items that offered no significant findings.
This may be due to our low number of participants, in which case we would expect a
change in results as we move forward with further data collection. We hope to understand
these effects better as this study progresses.
This research holds implications for the way in which we approach teaching
complex ecological concepts, and for developing tools to increase cooperation among
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stakeholders. Using simulated social dilemma games appears to increase interest and
enjoyment, while also leading to deeper levels of understanding with regard to certain
elements inherent in such problems, such as social dynamics, and the importance of
conservation. As we continue this study we hope to further explore and revise our
understanding of the theoretical frameworks provided by HRCT and Ostrom’s concepts
of Bayesian Reasoning and mental models. The practical benefits of this include a more
robust knowledge of the processes that drive learning and cooperation, leading to the
development of new techniques and materials that can be used in a variety of learning
environments to help increase awareness and encourage greater support for conservation
efforts.
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Appendix A
List of All Questions That Appear on the Learning Quiz

Quiz Instructions
** Important Instructions **
Next, we will test your understanding of key concepts. The questions in this quiz test
your knowledge of concepts from the Cattle Farming Board Game, the real-world
situation that the game is based on, and other information you saw or experienced in
today’s experiment.
The questions in this section have correct and incorrect answers.
There are 3 short essay questions, and 15 multiple choice questions. You will be paid
$0.50 (50 cents) for each short essay question, and $0.15 (15 cents) for each multiple
choice question you answer correctly. If you answer all questions correctly, you can
earn $3.75 for this quiz. Try your best to get each question correct.

Quiz Short Essay Items
Instructions: Short Essay Questions
There are 3 questions in this section. You will receive $0.50 (50 cents) for each question
in this section.
Defining a Social Dilemma
Item Prompt: What are the key features or characteristics of a situation that make it a
social dilemma? Briefly explain each feature.
Click the box below to type your response.
____________________
Defining a Social Dilemma Game
Item Prompt: Briefly explain how the Cattle Farming Board Game is a social dilemma.
What aspects of the game make it a social dilemma? Give examples from the game to
explain your answer.
Click the box below to type your response.
____________________
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Defining Environmental Complexity
Item Prompt: Briefly explain how the Cattle Farming Board Game is a complex
environmental situation.
Click the box below to type your response.
____________________
Quiz Multiple Choice Items
Instructions: Multiple Choice Questions
There are 15 questions in this section. You will receive $0.15 (15 cents) for each question
you anwer correctly.
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 1
Item Prompt: What is a social dilemma? Choose the single best answer.
1. A situation where one person does not get what he or she wants.
2. A situation where people are fighting.
3. A situation where individual goals conflict with what is best for the group.
4. All of the above.
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 2
Item Prompt: Which of the following situations is a Resource Dilemma? Choose the
single best answer.
1. Each roommate in a sorority house needs to contribute some time and energy to get all
the chores done.
2. Students in the library must wait for an open computer station, in order to use a
computer.
3. Several students enter a bus, and there are plenty of seats for everyone.
4. Several students are having an argument about something they learned in class.
Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 3
Item Prompt: True or False: In social dilemma situations like the cattle farming situation
in the United States’ Ogallala Aquifer and the Cattle Farming Board Game…
True or False
True

False

PLAYING GAMES TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING
People’s decisions do not
affect other people.

55

o
o

o
o

If each person acts
selfishly, everyone could
suffer.

o

o

Groups get better outcomes
(e.g., more money) if
everyone works together.

o

o

Cooperation is guaranteed.

Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 4
Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, one of the Players tends to have an
advantage in the game. Who is it?
1. Player 1.
2. Player 2.
3. Player 3.
4. Player 4.

Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 5
Item Prompt: Here is a picture of the Cattle Farming Board Game. Which Players can
affect Player 1’s earnings? Select all that apply.

▢ Player 1
▢ Player 2
▢ Player 3
▢ Player 4
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Multiple Choice: Social Dilemma Item 6
Item Prompt: In the United States, some of the actions cattle farmers take directly (or
indirectly) increase competition and make it harder for other farmers to earn money.
Use what you have learned today about cattle farming to select each action that increases
competition among farmers. Select all that apply.
Does this increase competition?
Yes
Putting a lot of cattle in a
single area of your pasture.

No

o
o

o
o

Letting your cattle drink
from the creek that is
shared between you and
other farmers.

o

o

Cutting down a forest to
make room for more cattle
on your pasture.

o

o

Removing some cattle from
your pasture and planting
some new trees/forests.

o

o

Cutting down a few trees
from your forest for timber.

Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 1
Item Prompt: What happens when a lot of forests are cut down to make room for more
cattle? Choose the single best answer.
1. There is more open land for cattle grazing, so the farmers can earn even more money
by taking more cattle to the market.
2. The area cannot sustain the cattle or farmers because the soil and land becomes barren.
3. More forests will grow back and replace the old forests.
4. Nothing. The number of trees or forests has no effect on cattle or farmers.
Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 2
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Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, why can’t you place two High Cattle
Tokens near each other (connected by a line) in the pasture? Choose the single best
answer.
1. There would be too many cattle to sustain enough plant life to feed the cattle.
2. There is not enough physical space for the cattle. They do not fit.
3. Having too many cattle attracts predators that might eat the cattle.
4. Having too many cattle in one area creates an over-supplied market, decreasing their
value.

Multiple Choice: Ecological Dilemma Item 3
Item Prompt: In the Cattle Farming Board Game, what happens if there are two cattle
tokens in the same creek? Choose the single best answer.
1. Players (farmers) can continue to put as many cattle on the creek as they want until it is
full.
2. The cattle have access to fresh water, so they become healthier (High Cattle Tokens),
which are worth more money at the market.
3. If anyone puts more cattle on the creek, the creek will dry up and the cattle will die.
4. Nothing. Players (farmers) are not allowed to put any cattle in the creeks, because of
pollution it might cause.
Instructions Social Dilemma Items
Instructions: Identifying Social Dilemmas
Next, we would like to see your ability to recognize real-world social dilemmas.
Some of the situations we show or describe in this section are social dilemmas like
the one in the cattle farming board game, others are different kinds of social
dilemmas, and others are not dilemmas at all.
Please try your best to identify the social dilemmas.
You will earn $0.15 (15 cents) for each correct answer.

Dilemma 1: Fossil Fuel Common Pool Resource Dilemma
Item Prompt: Most people in the world use fossil fuels (e.g., petroleum and oil) to fuel
their vehicles, transport goods, and power machinery for making other goods. There is a
limited supply of fossil fuel in the world. Many countries, companies, and people want to
use the valuable fossil fuels.
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Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
Dilemma 2: Black Friday Common Pool Resource Dilemma
Item Prompt: On Black Friday in the U.S., a limited number of highly desired electronics
(e.g., video game systems, televisions) go on sale for one day. These products are
discounted substantially, so many people come to stores, camping out the night before, in
order to be the first person to get in the store and reach the sale items.
Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
Dilemma 3: Water Public Good Dilemma
Item Prompt: The City of Louisville needs to raise about $4.3 Billion in order to fix old
water delivery pipes and sewer pipes, pumps, and water treatment facilities. To do this,
the City may raise taxes, and the Metropolitan Sewer District may raise its monthly fees.
Everyone would benefit from improved water systems, even people who do not pay for
them, or pay less.
Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
Dilemma 4: Blood Drive Public Good Dilemma
Item Prompt: In a typical blood drive, hospitals would like as many people as possible to
donate blood for people who need a blood transfusion in a medical emergency. Everyone
can benefit from the blood that is donated, but few people donate their blood.
Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
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Dilemma 5: Group Project Public Good Dilemma
Item Prompt: Instructors sometimes require their students to work in groups, for a group
project. Everyone in the group gets the same grade, even students that do not do as much
work.
Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
Dilemma 6: Party Foil
Item Prompt: A group of college students has gathered for a party. There are a lot of
people there, and just as many boxes of pizza, bags of chips, drinks and other food for
everyone. The party is being held in one of the largest sorority houses on campus, late
into the night. A few people get into an argument about something one of them posted
online in social media.
Is this a social dilemma?
1. Yes
2. No
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Appendix B
List of Charitable Organizations Participants Could Donate to
Participants were given the opportunity (choice) to donate some of their in-game earnings
to the charity, as a tangible indicator of cooperation. Donations were handled privately
via computer, and blinded from the experimenter, so that individuals could make a
voluntary decision free from social pressure. The amount of money donated anonymously
to charities at the end of the experiment was used to assess differences in participant’s
understanding of deep mechanics within social dilemmas, as well as their ability to
transfer what they have learned to real world dilemmas.
1. Farm Aid
Farm Aid’s mission is to keep family farmers on the land. We’re best known for our
annual music, food and farm festival, but the truth is we work each and every day,
year-round to build a system of agriculture that values family farmers, good food, soil
and water, and strong communities. Learn more about our day-to-day work to
celebrate and strengthen farmers, advocate for fair farm policies, connect farmers and
eaters, and bring family farm food to everyone.
Click Link: https://www.farmaid.org/our-work/
donation area.

*Scroll to middle of page to find

2. The International Union For the Conservation of Nature
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is a membership union
uniquely composed of both government and civil society organisations. It provides
public, private and non-governmental organisations with the knowledge and tools that
enable human progress, economic development and nature conservation to take place
together. Our experts are organised into six commissions dedicated to species
survival, environmental law, protected areas, social and economic policy, ecosystem
management, and education and communication.
Click Link: https://www.iucn.org/donate *To enter your own dollar amount, look for
the empty box.
3. The Cornucopia Institute
The Cornucopia Institute engages in educational activities supporting the ecological
principles and economic wisdom underlying sustainable and organic agriculture.
Through research and investigations on agricultural issues, the Cornucopia Institute
provides needed information to consumers, family farmers, and the media.
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Click Link: https://www.cornucopia.org/donate/
4. The Rotary Foundation
The Rotary Foundation is a not-for-profit corporation funded solely by voluntary
contributions from members and friends of Rotary who support its mission to advance
world understanding, goodwill, and peace. Using Rotary Foundation grants, Rotary's
34,000 clubs across the globe develop and carry out sustainable humanitarian projects
and provide scholarships and professional training opportunities that promote peace,
fight disease, provide clean water, sustain mothers and children, improve education,
and strengthen local economies.
Click Link: https://my.rotary.org/en/donate

If you make a donation, be sure to close the webpage when you finish. And, fill out
the confidential Donation Form, which is on the desk.

